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The operations of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), a state trading enterprise, have 
generated controversy over the years, partly because of an alleged lack of transparency 
in its operations. This study examines one aspect of operations that is not well 
understood – the government guarantee of CWB borrowings and export credit sales. 
This special privilege allows the CWB to generate a “financial cushion”, or non–
market based revenue, that it can use to enhance returns to producers, discount export 
prices, or pay administrative expenses. Although recent WTO dispute settlement 
decisions concluded the CWB does not act inconsistently with some WTO rules, the 
July 31, 2004 WTO Doha Round framework agreement addresses these potential 
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Introduction 
T 
he December 15, 2003 announcement by the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) of a 
C$85 million wheat pool deficit added fuel to the long-standing debate about the 
ability of state trading enterprises (STEs), and specifically the CWB, to engage in 
undisciplined trade-distorting practices. The detractors of STEs note that, while 
members of the World Trade Organization undertook specific obligations on export 
subsidies and trade-distorting domestic subsidies, the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA) contains no meaningful disciplines on STEs.  
The U.S. wheat industry has persistently claimed that the CWB is able to undercut 
commercially offered export prices in select markets or sell higher-quality wheat at 
discounted prices, but the industry can offer only limited anecdotal evidence to 
support those claims. The CWB claims it has the ability to price discriminate in 
different markets and that it is able to return premiums to producers by virtue of its 
single-desk selling and other privileges (3, 11). 
Even if one assumes global commodity markets are competitive and STEs do not 
have market power, “state trading enterprises are an enigma” (12, p. 415). Remarkably 
little, either theoretical or empirical, is actually known about the alleged trade-
distorting effects of state trading enterprises. A better understanding of these effects is 
crucial because STEs often control a significant share of world commodity trade. In 
this case, the CWB historically has been the world’s single largest wheat exporter, 
accounting for 15–20 percent of world wheat exports. 
The decisive point in this controversy is the fact that the CWB, as an STE, is 
granted unique and special privileges by the Government of Canada (GOC) that allow 
it to operate in a manner fundamentally different from a private commercial 
enterprise. This possibility exists because the CWB can generate a “financial 
cushion”, not from its market-based activities but as a result of its use of the special 
privileges. The financial cushion encompasses both explicit benefits (for example, 
additional non-sales revenue) as well as implicit benefits (for example, reduced 
financial risk), and can be used in various ways – to enhance returns to producers, to 
discount prices in export markets, to pass on benefits to processors, or to pay 
administrative expenses (see 7 and 9).  
In recent years farm groups in Canada have begun analyzing CWB operations, 
especially the financial and credit operations, demanding better accountability and 
transparency. This article builds on those efforts, using the limited data available from 
the CWB annual reports and the GOC‘s public accounts, to examine one of the 
CWB’s special privileges – the GOC guarantee of CWB borrowing and export credit 
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sales. The article examines how the CWB makes use of this privilege to generate the 
financial cushion and how the CWB potentially uses the cushion in its operations and 
sales. The final section discusses the recent WTO panel on the CWB and the 
implications for reform of the CWB of the July draft framework agreement from the 
WTO Doha negotiations. 
Generating a Financial Cushion from Government 
Guarantees 
T 
he CWB has been granted unique privileges and special rights by the GOC, 
including monopsony procurement and monopoly selling rights for wheat and 
barley, a government-guaranteed initial price, and preferential access to the grain 
handling and transportation system. Other perhaps less well-known privileges are the 
GOC guarantee of all CWB borrowings and the guarantee of principal and interest on 
export credit sales.
1 
Preferential Borrowing Activity 
The CWB borrows funds to finance various activities, including the initial and interim 
payments to producers, the cash advance programs, and investment activities. These 
borrowings are undertaken with the approval of the minister of finance (2, 2000/01 
report, p. 30). From 1994/95 to 2002/03, annual CWB net borrowing ranged from 
C$6.2 to C$7.6 billion, figures that exceeded annual sales revenue each year over the 
same period (table 1).  











borrowing  Period 
million C$ 
1994/95 4,526  6,492  45,478 45,440 7,320 
1995/96 5,829  6,459  51,904 52,848 6,377 
1996/97 6,111  6,241 61,968  61,872  6,474 
1997/98 4,758  6,716 184,969  184,745  6,698 
1998/99 4,011  6,769 48,858  48,770  6,786 
1999/00 4,457  7,264 85,663  79,119  6,544 
2000/01 4,221  7,645 85,266  84,627  7,182 
2001/02  4,379 7,336  31,185  30,618  7,749 
2002/03  3,340 6,431  26,167  27,101  6,815 
1 The first two columns are from the CWB annual reports. Data are on an August 1–
July 31 year. The last 3 columns are from the Public Accounts of Canada, which are 
on an April 1–March 31 fiscal year. 
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In addition, the Public Accounts of Canada reports the CWB’s gross borrowings 
and repayments, which ranged on an annual basis from C$26 billion to C$185 billion. 
The CWB notes that “although it has an outstanding debt of approximately C$8 
billion, the total volume of transactions during any given year will be many times this 
amount. The reason is the borrowing must be refinanced many times during the year 
to fund ongoing requirements” (6, p. 2).
2 This borrowing activity is extremely large 
compared to CWB sales revenue. 
Guarantees on Export Credit Sales 
The CWB is authorized to make credit sales mainly under two programs – the Credit 
Grain Sales Program (CGSP) and Agri-food Credit Facility (ACF). The CGSP (or its 
predecessor) has existed since 1952 and is by far the larger program, covering sales to 
customers who can offer a sovereign guarantee of repayment. The Government of 
Canada, in consultation with the CWB, approves country eligibility and individual 
country credit ceilings on an annual basis. Repayment terms cannot exceed 36 
months, and commercial interest rates are charged. The ACF was established in 1995 
to make sales to private importers. The GOC guarantees the repayment of principal 
and interest of all sales (receivables) under the CGSP and a declining percentage of all 
receivables under the ACF.  
Credit sales have typically accounted for about 10–15 percent of total CWB sales, 
but in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the share rose to as high as 35 percent because 
of large sales to the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Beginning in the early 1980s, some 
customers failed to repay loans under the CGSP. Many loans, totaling billions of 
dollars, were rescheduled through bilateral and multilateral (Paris Club) initiatives, in 
some cases over a 25-year period.
3 Reschedulings applied to many major (and current) 
customers, including Brazil, Poland, FSU, Algeria, Egypt, Mexico, Iran, Iraq, and 
Israel. Reschedulings under the AFC were first reported in the 1997/98 CWB annual 
report but are much smaller than reschedulings under the CGSP and are not done 
through the Paris Club. 
Debt Rescheduling, Accounts Receivable, and Net Interest 
Earnings 
When the CWB makes a sale on credit, the credit is extended at a commercial rate. 
Then the CWB borrows at a preferential rate (because of the government guarantee) 
the same amount extended as credit. “With the CWB’s borrowing power, it is able to 
borrow money at a lower rate of interest than the rate extended to the credit customer. 
As a result, the CWB benefits from the spread in interest rates in the form of excess 
interest revenues over interest expenses” (2, 2000/01, p. 27). This revenue is 
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designated as “net interest earnings” and reportedly goes into the pool accounts. Over 
90 percent of net interest earnings accrue from borrowings for past credit sales. 
Net interest earnings have increased steadily and correspond with the growth in 
accounts receivable from rescheduled debt from past credit sales (table 2). These 
accounts receivable are treated as an asset in the CWB financial statements and serve 
as a basis for future borrowing. If debt is repaid, as in 2002/03, and accounts 
receivable fall, net interest earnings decline commensurately. 
 
Table 2  CWB Accounts Receivable from Credit Sales, Net Interest Earnings, and 

















1983/84 3,012  15  25  1993/94 6,997  63  41 
1984/85 3,684  -10  26  1994/95 6,727  58  44 
1985/86 3,517  0  28  1995/96 6,654  81  43 
1986/87 3,465  4  27  1996/97 6,418  83  47 
1987/88 3,581  24  28  1997/98 7,023  76  54 
1988/89 3,708  36  29  1998/99 6,876  73  57 
1989/90 4,649  38  30  1999/00 7,207  71  64 
1990/91 5,425  -2  33  2000/01 7,179  75  66 
1991/92 6,214  52  35  2001/02 6,965  92  61 
1992/93 6,772  77  37  2002/03 5,904  55  67 
Source: (2). 
 
Every year the debt goes unpaid means the CWB has to borrow more money to 
cover the unpaid principal and interest. For a private company trying to service unpaid 
debt, this would represent a financial burden, but for the CWB it represents a financial 
gain. One study estimated taxpayer costs from government guarantees at C$2.50 per 
ton, based on a CWB estimate of C$60 million in annual net interest earnings (8). 
“This suggests that if the Canadian taxpayer had only given more credit to Iran, Iraq, 
FSU, etc., the underwriting ‘benefit’ would far exceed the $60 million per year!” (p. 
85) The role of the GOC in this process is paramount. If the GOC decided to write off 
the debt, it would have to make good on its guarantee to the CWB, which is now 
almost C$6 billion.  
Debt Relief and Reduction Agreements 
There is another financial aspect to the CWB credit sales. Beginning in 1990/91, as 
part of debt rescheduling and relief arrangements between the GOC, the CWB, and 
the foreign buyer, the GOC began to make direct payments to the CWB (table 3). 
“Under these debt reduction arrangements, amounts that otherwise would have been 
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paid by the debtor government are paid to the Corporation [the CWB] by the GOC” 
(2, described in the financial notes, various issues).  
A Canadian farm group, using data from Finance Canada, reports that payments 
from the GOC to the CWB between 1991 and 2000 were C$1.8 billion, mostly 
interest payments associated with debt forgiveness for Poland and Egypt (table 3) 
(16). The data reported by the CWB apparently do not include all interest and 
principal payments resulting from the debt forgiveness for (primarily) Poland and 
Egypt, thus understating the financial benefit to the CWB from the GOC’s debt 
reduction programs.  
 
Table 3  Payments Due to the CWB from the GOC under Debt Reduction Agreements 
(million C$) 
Marketing year  CWB annual report  Finance Canada  AAFC 
1991/92 NA  109 NA 
1992/93 NA  180 NA 
1993/94 135  138 157 
1994/95 61  62 145 
1995/96 131  347 349 
1996/97 53  236 281 
1997/98 57  173 205 
1998/99 57  171 258 
1999/00 58  175 238 
2000/01 54  176 211 
2001/02 31  NA 170 
2002/03 26  NA  147(e) 
NA = not available.   
Sources: (1, 2, 16). 
 
Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (AAFC) also reports on debt service or debt 
reduction payments to the CWB (1). These data are not strictly comparable to the 
other series because they also include grants for product promotion and market 
development. In its methodology section, AAFC notes that “The debt reduction 
payments to the CWB are incorporated in the federal time series from 1991/92” (1, 
June 2003, p. 75). 
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The increase in 1995/96 reflects a “contingent liability” of the GOC of C$138.9 
million under the export credit guarantee. A contingent liability is recorded in the 
public accounts when it becomes likely that a government payment will be made and 
a reasonable and reliable estimate can be made.
4 This entry suggests there was a 
default (or multiple defaults) on payments under a credit sale and the GOC made a 
payment to the CWB to cover the principal. CWB annual reports do not include this 
payment. These conflicting sources of data reinforce the lack of transparency in CWB 
reporting. 
How the CWB Uses the Financial Cushion 
T 
his section discusses how the financial cushion made possible by the government 
guarantees may be used by the CWB, although the lack of transparency in 
reporting makes this discussion a problematic exercise. 
Net Interest Earnings and CWB Expenses 
Net interest earnings from the credit receivables are recorded in the pool accounts to 
which the original credit sales related (13). The CWB Act specifies that net interest 
earnings are to be treated as a cost and “that such amounts be treated as charges or 
recoveries of operating costs” (2, 1999/2000 report, p. 63). The CWB charges its 
administrative and general expenses to the pool accounts. Beginning in 1988/89, with 
the exception of 1990/91 and 2002/03, net interest earnings have more than covered 
the costs of running the CWB (see table 2).    
Net interest earnings in the four pools generally ranged from C$1 to C$5 per ton 
per commodity (table 4). The exception has been the feed barley pool, where allocated 
net interest earnings have recently ranged from C$8 to C$146 per ton. Because the 
CWB has historically treated them as a negative cost, net interest earnings have the 
accounting effect of reducing CWB costs. Since 1998/99 the large net interest 
earnings mean total operating costs for the feed barley pools have actually been 
negative. 
Distortion from Net Interest Earnings 
The large net interest earnings per ton for feed barley have arisen because feed barley 
exports have fallen sharply over the past five years, primarily due to a significant 
increase in domestic feed use from expanding livestock inventories. Net interest 
earnings do not vary greatly with the current size of the pool (because they mostly 
reflect past credit sales and rescheduled debt payments), so a smaller pool size 
translates into higher interest earnings per ton (table 5). 
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Table 4  CWB Operating Costs and Net Interest Earnings (C$/ton)
1 
 
Item  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
old 
2001/02 
new  2002/03 
Wheat   
Net interest earnings  -4.26  -3.30  -4.30 -4.15 -2.91 -4.18  -5.23 5.23 4.54 
Total operating costs  5.15  5.85  3.39 3.93 5.40 5.14  1.14 19.73 24.02 
Durum wheat   
Net interest earnings  -2.35  -2.29  -2.81 -2.05 -1.90 -2.21  -3.68 3.68 2.24 
Total operating costs  6.56  5.18  4.57 17.29 21.32 23.97 17.35 32.64 26.16 
Feed barley   
Net interest earnings  -4.71  -3.15  -18.39 -22.34  -7.90 -14.11  -145.54 145.54 137.70 
Total operating costs  2.71  7.52  3.13  -11.19 -0.51 -2.45  -135.62       2.53  16.90 
Malting barley   
Net interest earnings  -1.75  -1.27  -2.01 -2.24 -1.69 -1.03  -0.92 0.92 1.52 
Total operating costs  0.48  0.97  1.53 1.37 3.16 5.15 5.46 6.98  10.82 
 
1 In the 2002/03 annual report, the method of reporting revenue and costs was 
substantially changed, especially the items included as costs, based on 
recommendations by Canada’s auditor general. Both methods are reported for 
2001/02 for comparison. For example, the category of “total operating costs” was 
replaced by “direct costs”. Net interest earnings are reported as a positive. The last 
two columns reflect this change. See the CWB 2002/03 annual report, page 25, for an 
explanation.   
Source: (2). 
 
The 2001/02 feed barley pool illustrates how net interest earnings can lead to 
market distortions (15). At the end of the year, the feed barley pool had shrunk by 
over 85 percent to only about 54,000 tons. With so few sales, per ton net interest 
earnings were incredibly large – C$276 per ton, considerably larger than the value of 
the barley. To keep the total payment to producers in line with the Pool Return 
Outlook (the PRO, a forecast producer return for each class in each pool) that had 
been projected throughout most of the year at C$180 (table 6), the CWB directors 
decided put about C$5.5 million (out of almost C$8 million in net interest earnings) 
from the feed barley pool into a contingency fund (4). 
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earnings  Fiscal year 
million C$  C$/ton 
1994/95 120.3  4.7  113.54 4.45 
1995/96 266.6  6.0  210.30 4.71 
1996/97 386.0  7.7  158.18 3.15 
1997/98 32.7  4.8 124.84  18.39 
1998/99 38.3  6.2 138.39  22.34 
1999/00 90.3  5.3 134.38 7.90 
2000/01 63.2  6.4 139.13  14.11 
2001/02 8.9  7.9  162.86 
2   145.54 
2002/03 6.7  5.5  168.28 
3   137.70 
1  The 2001/02 data are from the 2002/03 annual report, which uses the new 
accounting procedures. The 2001/02 report showed sales revenue at C$9.5 million 
and C$174.82 per ton.   
2 C$130.85 was placed in a contingency fund.   
3 C$127.89 was placed in a contingency fund.   
Source: (2). 
 
Some farmers complained that the CWB kept the PRO too high to attract barley 
into the pool (the PRO was generally above other feed barley prices through much of 
the year), while others said that the CWB sold into low-priced export markets, and 
others believed that farmers who delivered to the feed barley pool should have kept all 
the revenue (14). The CWB said the PRO reflected its judgment as to what was a 
“reasonable return” to the feed barley pool, based on factors such as malting barley 
prices, domestic feed prices, and expected exports (5). 
The controversy surrounding the feed barley pool in 2001/02 was basically 
repeated in 2002/03. How the CWB may use net interest earnings in export pricing 
decisions or determining returns to producers remains unclear. One study concluded, 
“Therefore, it can be argued that a few Western Canadian farmers are the beneficiaries 
of a government-sponsored program (guarantees) that contributes to or supports the 
prices received via the CWB pools” (15, pp. 52–53; italics added). 
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Table 6  Barley Prices, Crop Year 2001/02 
PRO 
1 Winnipeg 
2  U.S. 
3  U.S. 
4  EU 
export 
Black Sea 
export  Month 
C$ per metric ton 
Feb 2001  146  133  106  172  NA  NA 
June 2001  149  135  105  160  NA  NA 
July 2001  162  152  105  164  155  149 
Aug 2001  165  156  106  163  164  147 
Oct 2001  180  160  109  171  161  153 
Dec 2001  180  160  113  170  166  164 
Feb 2002  180  158  114  172  161  161 
Mar 2002  180  154  113  168  150  151 
April 2002  180  140  112  161  147  143 
May 2002  180  140  109  160  141  136 
June 2002  180  154  108  158  135  132 
Season avg.  180 
5  156 109 165  153  148 
1 No. 1 CW, Vancouver.   
2 Average closing prices, Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, for the furthest out contract 
(December 2001, March 2002, and July 2002).   
3 No. 2, feed, Duluth.   
4 No. 2, feed, Portland.   
5 Total feed barley pool payment.   
Sources: Economic Research Service, USDA, Feed Outlook, various issues; Foreign 
Agricultural Service, USDA for EU and Black Sea prices; CWB PRO announcements 
from its website; Canada Grains Council, Statistics Handbook, various issues; 
Agriculture and Agri-food Canada market reports. 
Commerce and ITC Findings on the Government Guarantees 
In the 2003 countervailing duty investigation against Canadian wheat, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce found that the combined effect of the government guarantee 
of the CWB initial price, borrowing, and lending confers a benefit to wheat of 4.94 
percent; that is, the value of subsidy was equal to about 5 percent of the value of the 
wheat (17).
5 Commerce noted that without the GOC’s guarantee, lenders would 
examine the quality of the CWB’s pool of accounts receivable to ascertain the 
appropriate credit rating for the CWB, and the CWB would have to borrow at a higher 
rate. The accounts receivable would likely become non-performing assets because 
some of this debt is 25 years old and is owed by financially risky countries. The 
CWB’s operating costs would no longer be “paid for” by net interest earnings and 
producer returns would be lower. 
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Another study estimated the benefit of the GOC guarantee of CWB borrowing at 
C$107 million in 2000, assuming the government guarantee allows the CWB to 
borrow at a lower rate than private borrowers (10, pp. 3-21–3-23).   
Prospects for Reform of STEs in the WTO   
B 
ecause of the government guarantees, the CWB is able to generate and use a 
financial cushion potentially worth, in the extreme feed barley case, many 
dollars per ton. The CWB can use the financial cushion as a domestic or export 
subsidy by enhancing returns to producers or discounting export prices by not 
charging full value for quality or services (7, 9). These practices can affect 
competition in world markets.   
Are the current disciplines in the WTO sufficient for addressing potential trade-
distorting activities of STEs such as the CWB? Or do the practices of the CWB that 
flow from the government privilege require new WTO disciplines? Three possible 
WTO disciplines are currently available for addressing potentially trade-distorting 
practices of STEs – GATT Article XVII, export subsidy provisions of the URAA, and 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). 
Recent developments in both the Doha Round negotiations and dispute settlement 
panels also point to possible directions for reform. 
Current WTO Disciplines 
The United States attempted unsuccessfully to use one current discipline, GATT 
Article XVII, which governs STEs, to address CWB export practices.
6  (See the 
technical annex for the relevant portions of GATT Article XVII and the Ad note.) The 
United States argued that the CWB “export regime”, or the legal framework that 
grants the special and exclusive privileges, including the government guarantee on 
CWB borrowings and credit sales, necessarily resulted in export sales that were 
inconsistent with GATT Article XVII, which requires that STEs make “purchases or 
sales solely consistent with commercial considerations.” The panel disagreed and 
concluded that the United States had not demonstrated that CWB export sales were 
inconsistent with the commercial considerations standard of Article XVII (21). 
Following appeals by both the United States and Canada, on August 30, 2004 the 
WTO appellate body upheld the panel findings with respect to the CWB’s compliance 
with Article XVII (20). Both rulings agreed that STEs can use their privileges while 
engaged in commercial activity, subject to the limitation on discriminatory treatment, 
but neither ruling shed much light on the definition of “commercial considerations”.  
Another potential avenue for disciplining STEs can be found in Article 10(1) of 
the URAA, which deals with circumvention of export subsidy commitments, 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  112   C. Goodloe 
including through use of “non-commercial transactions” (see the technical annex). 
The financial cushion provided through the GOC guarantees on borrowing and 
lending may allow it to export using non-commercial transactions. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce finding in the CVD investigation supports a claim of non-
commercial exports by means of a subsidy resulting from the government guarantees. 
But the lack of a definition in Article 10(1) and the absence of data on actual CWB 
sales that could be clearly demonstrated as being “non-commercial” suggest that a 
circumvention case against the CWB would be difficult.  
A last avenue may be found in the SCM Agreement and items (j) and (k) in the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, which govern the use of export credits (see the 
technical annex). There is no public information available on the long-run operating 
costs and losses of the CWB’s export credit program to evaluate the program under 
item (j). It is also not clear how the ability to generate revenue from rescheduled debt 
under export credit guarantees, or the GOC payments of interest and principal to the 
CWB on behalf of debtors, would be treated under items (j) and (k). A formal 
challenge would likely be necessary to bring forth the needed data.
7 
WTO Proposals on STEs and Export Credit Guarantees 
In light of the uncertainty of existing WTO provisions, export STEs and export credit 
guarantees have been an important part of the Doha Development Round negotiations 
on export competition. In 2002 the United States put forth a proposal to discipline 
export STEs as part of its comprehensive proposal for the Doha Round. Not 
surprisingly, given the long-standing and contentious bilateral dispute between certain 
U.S. wheat interests and the CWB, the proposal aimed mainly at the CWB. The three 
main elements were: 
•  to end exclusive export rights in order to ensure private sector 
competition in markets controlled by single desk exporters;  
•  to establish WTO requirements for single desk exporters to provide 
notification of acquisition costs, export pricing and other sales 
information; and 
•  to eliminate the use of government funds or guarantees to support or 
ensure the financial viability of single desk exporters
8  
 
The United States also proposed disciplines on export credits and credit 
guarantees. The proposal reflects the contentious negotiations on export credit 
disciplines, begun after the Uruguay Round under the auspices of the OECD. In 
November 2000, all OECD participants signaled their acceptance of a compromise 
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agreement except Canada, which made clear it would not accept the proposal, which 
required the disciplines be applied to an export STE.
9  Like the OECD proposal, the 
U.S. proposal clearly applies to export STEs, not just to governments, and targets 
CWB practices under its credit guarantee programs, including rescheduled debt and 
net interest earnings. 
The European Union also called for additional WTO disciplines on STEs. The EU 
noted that the exclusive and special rights granted STEs can result in market power 
and unfair competition in world markets. Through cross-subsidization, price 
discrimination, and price pooling, STEs can circumvent export subsidy commitments. 
The EU proposal called for increased transparency and stricter notification 
requirements with respect to indirect export subsidies.
10 
Canada did not put forward a specific proposal on STEs, but an earlier Canadian 
government study provided a classification scheme for STEs to aid in trade 
negotiations (19). The authors state “the most effective way of ensuring that STEs do 
not subsidize exports is to ensure that these are self-financing institutions that are 
insulated from government” (p. 32). As the authors note, “the major concern about 
these bodies [export STEs], heightened by alleged lack of transparency, is the 
possibility that they may be used as a means of covert export subsidization” (p. 88). 
The authors claimed any subsidies associated with the CWB, such as from pool 
deficits or export credit guarantees, were in conformity with WTO commitments. 
Based on this analysis of the ability of agricultural STEs to distort world markets, the 
GOC did not see a need for further disciplines on STEs. 
Doha Framework Agreement 
On July 31, 2004, WTO members agreed on a framework that set the general 
guidelines and parameters for reaching a final agreement on agriculture under the 
Doha Development Round. The framework agreement included specific provisions on 
export STEs and export credits, generally reflecting the U.S. and EU proposals. The 
Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for “reduction of, with a view to phasing out, all 
forms of export subsidies.” The specific language for STEs and export credit 
guarantees states: 
The following will be eliminated by the end date to be agreed: 
Terms and conditions relating to export credits, export credit 
guarantees, or insurance programmes with repayment periods of 180 
days and below which are not in accordance with disciplines to be 
agreed. These disciplines will cover, inter alia, payment of interest, 
minimum interest rates, minimum premium requirements, and other 
elements which can constitute subsidies or otherwise distort trade.
 
• 
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Trade distorting practices with respect to exporting STEs, including 
eliminating export subsidies provided to or by them, government 
financing, and the underwriting of losses. The issue of the future use 
of monopoly powers will be subject to further negotiation.
11 
• 
By identifying subsidies and other government actions specific to STEs as export 
subsidies, the framework language has implications for CWB government guarantees 
and credit sales. The government guarantees that reduce borrowing costs, direct cash 
infusions for debt reduction agreements, and net interest earnings that accrue as a 
result of debt forgiveness from credit sales could all come under scrutiny. The GOC 
has never notified subsidies associated with the CWB government guarantees, such as 
identified in the U.S. CVD investigation. If the government guarantees on borrowing 
and lending were eliminated (along with GOC underwriting of pool deficits), the 
CWB financial structure would presumably look significantly different. Borrowing 
costs would be higher, net interest earnings would mostly disappear, and the 
government payments for debt reduction would not be available. If net interest 
earnings were no longer available to the pools, the CWB pricing structure for 
individual sales might have to be adjusted. Just how these changes would affect the 
CWB’s export and pricing of wheat and barley exports is unclear. 
Conclusions 
T 
he government guarantees of all CWB borrowing and export credit sales allow 
the CWB to generate a financial cushion – non–market based revenue – which 
can be used to pay operating expenses, enhance returns to producers, or discount 
export prices. The role of the government in generating the financial cushion is 
paramount. The lack of transparency and reporting makes it difficult to ascertain the 
size and use of the financial cushion. In the highly competitive world grain market, a 
margin of even a few dollars per ton can be crucial in making a sale over a competitor. 
Current WTO disciplines cannot capture the complex and non-transparent activities of 
the CWB. The recently concluded WTO framework agreement for the Doha 
negotiations calls for eliminating STE export subsidies and for new rules on export 
credit guarantees, which could bring some transparency and discipline to these CWB 
privileges and practices. 
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Endnotes 
                                                       
*   The author gratefully acknowledges the review comments of Peter Bonner, 
Frank Gomme, Demcey Johnson, Suchada Langley, Al Loyns, Amy 
Slusher, Vince Smith, and T. K. Warley. A special note of appreciation goes 
to Lynda Swanson for her path-breaking work on the CWB financing and 
credit activities. The views and opinions expressed here do not reflect the 
official views of the U.S. government. 
1. The CWB is a well-known institution in western Canada, and the author 
assumes readers are generally familiar with the CWB structure and function. 
See (10) for a complete description of the CWB. The other privileges have 
been extensively examined in the literature and are not discussed here. A 
longer paper that discusses all three elements is available from the author. 
2.  In response to questions posed by the U.S. government during consultations 
held on January 31, 2003, the GOC stated in a written reply on March 10, 
2003 that the CWB had informed them that the figure of C$185 billon was 
incorrect and should be C$47 billion. See Canada – Measures Relating to 
Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, (WT/DS276), First 
Written Submission of the United States of America, August 1, 2003. 
http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/briefs.shtml 
3.  The Paris Club is an informal international forum through which 
governments of debtor and creditor countries establish mutually agreed 
terms for the rescheduling and/or reduction of debts owed to the creditor 
governments and their public agencies. It first met in 1956. 
4.  Public Accounts of Canada, Summary Reports and Financial Statements, 
Section 10, Contingent Liabilities, Table 10.8, 1995-96. http://collection. 
nlc-bnc.ca/100/201/301/public_accounts_can/index.html. 
5.  The Department of Commerce noted, “the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the subsidy program at issue here [the comprehensive financial 
guarantees] are exceptional, particularly to the degree to which its various 
elements are interrelated” (17, p. 23). In its preliminary ruling on March 10, 
2003, Commerce also found that the payments the Canadian government 
made to the CWB as part of the debt forgiveness were export subsidies 
because the payments were contingent on export. But exports to the U.S. did 
not benefit from the payments, so Commerce did not find them 
countervailable (18). 
6.  At the request of the United States, a WTO panel, Canada – Measures 
Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, was formed 
on March 31, 2003, and a second panel was formed on July 11, 2003, 
following a procedural dispute. The panel issued its final report on April 6, 
2004. The United States and Canada both appealed, and the appellate body 
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issued its report on August 30, 2004. The WTO reports can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm#2003. 
7.  On September 8, 2004, a WTO panel ruled that U.S. export credit 
guarantees were export subsidies under Item (j). To reach such a conclusion, 
the panel examined U.S. data on long-run costs of the programs. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm.  
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8.  See http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/disciplines.htm. 
9.  The document, The Chairman’s Revised Proposal for a Sector 
Understanding on Export Credits for Agricultural Products, is dated July 9, 
2002, revised from the first November 2000 draft. It can be found at 
http://oecd.org/dataoecd/31/12/1939746.pdf. The document notes that a full 
consensus was not achieved. On May 17, 2001, Reuters reported that 
“Canada’s refusal to join an OECD agreement that would scale back 
government export credit guarantees for agricultural products means the 
effort will have to be negotiated by the World Trade Organization... . 
Canada was the lone holdout on the issue among the 30 industrialized 
nations that make up the OECD, a group that requires consensus for reforms 
to be put in place.” 
10. See G/AG/NG/W/34, European Communities Proposal: Export 
Competition, at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple 
11. WT/L/579 2 August 2004. Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 
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